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Contemporary walls, especially those around democracies, often undo or invert the 
contrasts they are meant to inscribe. Officially aimed at protecting putatively free, 
open, lawful, and secular societies from trespass, exploitation, or attack, the walls are 
built of suspended law, and inadvertently produce a collective ethos and subjectivity 
that is defensive, parochial, nationalistic, and militarized. They generate an 
increasingly closed and policed collective identity in place of the open society they 
would defend.  Wendy Brown: Walled States, Waning Sovereignty 
 
 
Set against the background of late twentieth century assumptions about the likely impact of 
globalisation – in which it was routinely assumed that combined forces of Euro-American 
capital and the multi-national corporations which it spawned would steadily sweep away 
jurisdictional borders of all kinds, so enabling them engineer the free movement of capital, of 
goods and of labour on a global scale to their hegemonic advantage – current twenty-first 
century developments are beginning to look increasingly paradoxical. Whilst processes of 
globalisation are proceeding apace, not least because the declining cost of transport, together 
with the availability of instant information transfer over the internet, have facilitated a further 
phase of exponential growth in the scale of the circulation of assets, goods and personnel on a 
global scale, the onset of the twenty first century also been marked by a sea-change in the 
structure of the global economy. Just as Euro-American steam-powered manufacturing 
initiatives finally swept aside, and ultimately overwhelmed the less mechanised productive 
capabilities of India and China in the early decades of the nineteenth century, such that the 
Euro-American powers were go on and establish themselves as global hegemons, so it is 
becoming increasingly clear, two centuries later, that India and China are moving into a 
position from which to reverse the swing of the pendulum.  
With such considerations in mind this article seeks to address some of the implications of 
what can best be understood – always provided we consider global history, as surely we 
must, in the longue durée – as the third, and still-emergent, phase of globalisation (Ballard 
2010).  However a brief article is no place to discuss all the many implications of these 
developments. Instead my agenda here is much narrower: rather it is to explore the reasons 
why, and the justifications offered for an increasingly contemporary development: namely the 
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steady reinforcement of the scale and salience of jurisdictional boundaries, in sharp contrast 
to the once conventional expectation that globalisation would lead to their steady elimination.  
Walls or Sieves? 
Whist Brown quite rightly points to the ever greater salience of exclusionary walls and fences 
which are currently under construction as a result of efforts to guard the internal integrity of a 
diverse range of jurisdictions – stretching all the way from democracies such as the United 
States and India to theocracies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia – a further salient feature of 
all these exercises is that they are all markedly porous in character. Their objective is not so 
much to hamper the free flow of goods and persons across the jurisdictional boundaries in 
question, but rather to preclude the inflow of unwanted goods, and above all unwanted 
persons, across them. In other words the central purpose of contemporary forms of boundary-
reinforcement is to facilitate the implementation of policies and processes of migration 
management.  
This points to a central paradox in contemporary policies of boundary construction, for in no 
way is their objective to secure the jurisdictions they contain in a condition position of North 
Korean style autarchy. Even when such walls and fences run across many miles of desert as 
well as across major mountain ranges, these structures are better understood as sieves: their 
objective is not so much to curb the passage of goods and persons across the border, but 
rather to channel those flows through a restricted range of valve-like crossing points at which 
large-scale movement across the disjunction can be readily monitored, thereby facilitating  
the central purpose of the whole exercise: to provide the least possible obstruction to those 
crossing the border on a legitimate basis and for legitimate purposes, whilst firmly excluding 
those persons – and to a more limited extent certain categories of those goods – who are 
unable to meet those criteria. That is what migration management is all about. 
The driving forces behind these developments are clear enough. As the cost of long-distance 
travel has plummeted in the course of the past few decades, labour-power has become 
steadily more mobile on a global scale. But whilst this has at one level proved to be a 
godsend for every prosperous jurisdiction, since their inhabitants can now tap into a vast 
reservoir labour power from which to recruit additional hands to perform all manner of 
menial tasks for minimal ages, on another over-recruitment of labour power ‘from below’, or 
in other words from their former colonial possession is now perceived as having alarming 
consequences in the longer term. Hence ‘immigration’ in this specific sense has become an 
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ever-intensifying source of popular alarm. In addition to being regarded as unwelcome 
competitors for scarce resources, the rapidly growing presence of the new minorities, together 
with their members’ commitment to maintaining a sense of their own ethno-religious 
distinctiveness has also precipitated intensifying fears that their distinctiveness represents an 
unacceptable threat to the integrity of the established socio-cultural order. Hence the central 
objective of migration management is to constrain this unwelcome – and hence unwanted – 
inflow, and if possible to reverse it.  
Despite all this, the objective of migration management is not to halt the inflow of labour 
migrants per se. After all there is still an ever-expanding demand for hands to carry out 
menial tasks such personal care for the elderly and the otherwise disabled, to carry out 
seasonal agricultural tasks and to provider manner of other forms of low-skilled and low-paid 
menial service. With such considerations in mind policies of migration management are best 
understood as the outcome of rational neo-liberal efforts to square this particular circle. From 
this perspective the category of persons who can best – or in other words, most flexibly – 
fulfil the demands of a constantly fluctuating labour market, and who can do so without 
precipitating the socio-cultural downsides that were generated as a result of previous episodes 
of ‘unmanaged’ migration, are lone individuals unencumbered by family obligations, who 
can not only be imported to fill vacant slots in the labour market as and when the need arises, 
but who can also be repatriated as and when the market has no further need for their services. 
However this neo-liberal dimension migration management is invariably conditioned by an 
additional process of selective sieving, such that these restrictions will have a minimal impact 
on immigrants of a ‘superior’ quality (typically defined as young, well educated and of 
indigenous Euro-American descent, or at least newcomers from elsewhere who can be 
expected readily to mimic Euro-American socio-cultural following their arrival), whilst 
tightly constricting the entry and residence of those who have few if any educational or 
professional  qualifications, and most especially so if they are of non-Euro-American origin. 
Moreover all these priorities are currently sustained by a flood of popular opinion, which no 
democratically elected government now afford to ignore if it wishes to remain in power.  
Hence one of the most ironic consequences of the current phase of globalisation is that whilst 
the once commonplace constraints on the transfer of information, of value (money) and of 
goods across jurisdictional boundaries have almost entirely disappeared, those directed at the 
movement of human beings across such boundaries have moved rapidly in the reverse 
direction. Passports only came into routine use in the aftermath of the First World War. But 
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as the process of border security has become steadily more intense in recent decades, so have 
passport regimes, which now aim to supplement documentary data with parallel processes of 
electronic and biometric scrutiny. But once again these controls are firmly selective in 
character. Globalisation still rules in the sense that the annual flow of persons across any 
given jurisdictional boundary is still following a pattern of exponential growth. Hence border 
controls are not absolute barriers: rather they provide a filtering service through which 
legitimate sheep can pass through with a minimal degree of obstruction – provided they 
survive increasingly intrusive personal security checks – whilst the unwelcome goats are 
firmly excluded.   
However closer inspection of this process reveals yet further levels of complexity, for it is 
soon apparent that those classed as admissible sheep fall into several quite distinct species, 
including 
i. Citizens, who normally have an absolute right to leave, and to return to, their native 
jurisdiction as and when they choose. 
ii. Visitors, who, whether they are travelling for business of pleasure, who confirm that 
they will shortly re-cross the border to return to the jurisdiction from whence they 
came. 
iii. Denizens, who, though lacking the rights of citizens, have nevertheless been granted 
some form of leave to remain within the jurisdiction in question, and who are 
typically entitled to take up employment so long as their leave to remain holds good, 
and who may well also be required to forfeit their leave to remain if they lose their 
jobs.   
Citizens and Denizens 
In legal terms border controls are a necessary feature of sovereignty: in post-Westphalian 
contexts states are routinely entitled to maintain both their socio-cultural and their territorial 
integrity by means of border controls. However to the extent that these provisions were 
established in a context were the scale of human traffic across jurisdictional boundaries was 
extremely limited, globalisation has played havoc with the premises which have long 
underpinned those conventions. And no-where have ever-increasing levels of 
transjurisdictional traffic played greater havoc with Westphalian premises than with respect 
to one of their core expectations: namely that henceforward nation-states would and should 
be constituted on homogenous, as opposed to pluralistic, socio-religious foundations.  
But if the Westphalian settlement served to bring more than a century of European warfare to 
an end, it is equally clear, especially with hindsight, that state-construction around the 
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premise of a homogeneous citizenry, and a consequent commitment to the extirpation of 
plurality, and especially of religious plurality, created as least as many problems as it 
resolved, if only because that condition could only be sustained if each such jurisdiction 
walled itself in so tightly that it became an autarchy with no contact whatsoever with 
outsiders. It follows that whilst the Westphalian settlement undoubtedly provided a novel set 
of solution to some pressing issues in the sphere international relationships, so much so that 
the conventions so established in that sphere still hold good, at least in principle, to this day, 
its parallel (but unrealistic) efforts to eliminate the de facto presence of plurality within 
jurisdictional boundaries by executive fiat has long been riddled with contradictions, which 
have in turn become steadily more explosive in the current phase of globalisation.  
However issues of jurisdictional plurality, whether precipitated by internal diversity or by the 
presence of newcomers from elsewhere were by no means a seventeenth century novelty. 
Writing in the context of a jurisdiction which still largely ignored the premises of the 
Westphalian settlement, Blackstone’s comments on these issues in the chapter entitled “Of 
People, Whether Aliens, Denizens or Natives” in his still much quoted Commentaries on the 
Laws of England (1765) deserved our close attention. In doing so he opens his discussion not 
so much in terms of the rights and obligations of citizens, but rather of those arising from 
their condition of natural subjecthood, as opposed those available to aliens:  
THE first and most obvious division of the people is into aliens and natural-born subjects. 
Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the dominions of the crown of England, that 
is, within the allegiance of the king; and aliens, such as are born out of it. Allegiance is the tie, 
or ligament, which binds the subject to the king, in return for that protection which the king 
affords the subject. 
Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the king's dominions 
immediately upon their birth. For, immediately upon their birth, they are under the king's 
protection; at a time too, when (during their infancy) they are incapable of protecting 
themselves. Natural allegiance is therefore a debt of gratitude; which cannot be forfeited, 
canceled, or altered, by any change of time, place, or circumstance, nor by anything but the 
united concurrence of the legislature 
Local allegiance is such as is due from an alien, or stranger born, for so long time as he 
continues within the king's dominion and protection: and it ceases, the instant such stranger 
transfers himself from this kingdom to another. Natural allegiance is therefore perpetual, and 
local temporary only: and that for this reason, evidently founded upon the nature of 
government; that allegiance is a debt due from the subject, upon an implied contract with the 
prince, that so long as the one affords protection, so long the other will demean himself 
faithfully. 
Natural-born subjects having a great variety of rights, which they acquire by being born 
within the king's ligeance, and can never forfeit by any distance of place or time, but only by 
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their own misbehaviour. The same is also in some degree the case of aliens; though their 
rights are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by residence here, and lost 
whenever they remove.  
An alien born may purchase lands, or other estates: but not for his own use; for the king is 
thereupon entitled to them. If an alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he must 
own an allegiance, equally permanent with that property, to the king of England; which would 
probably be inconsistent with that, which he owes the his own natural liege lord: besides that 
thereby the nation might in time be subject to foreign influence, and feel many other 
inconveniences.  
Yet an alien may acquire a property in goods, money, and other personal estate, or may hire a 
house for his habitation: for personal estate is of a transitory and movable nature; and besides, 
this indulgence to strangers is necessary for the advancement of trade. Aliens also may trade 
as freely as other people; only they are subject to certain higher duties at the custom-house. 
The children of aliens, born here in England, are, generally speaking, natural-born subjects, 
and entitled to all the privileges of such. 
A denizen is an alien born, but who has obtained by royal gift letters patent to make him an 
English subject: a high and incommunicable branch of the royal prerogative. A denizen is in a 
kind of middle state between an alien, and natural-born subject, and partakes of both of them. 
He may take lands by purchase or devise, which an alien may not. A denizen is not excused 
from paying the alien's duty, and some other mercantile burdens. And no denizen can be of 
the Privy Council, or either House of Parliament, or have any office of trust, civil or military, 
or be capable of any grant from the crown. 
It goes without saying that has changed since Blackstone laid out the pre-enlightenment 
provisions of subjecthood in Common Law, no less in England than in other parallel Euro-
American jurisdictions. Most notably the steadily become more sovereign status of 
Parliament has meant that the feudally defined status of royal subjects have steadily been 
redefined in such a way that they have become republican citizens.  
Nevertheless the distinction between the three population categories which Blackstone 
identifies – in modern parlance as between fully fledged citizens, with all the innate rights 
and duties to which that status gives rise, temporary visitors with no such rights, and denizens 
with at least some of the rights (and most of the duties) of citizens, remains thoroughly 
meaningful to this day. Of course some of the definitions have changed dramatically. Hence 
whilst it was once the case that anyone born in territory to subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Crown automatically gave rise to British subjecthood, legislation introduced during the 
course of the past half-century has swept away all such pretensions. Birth within the UK no 
longer automatically gives rise to the British citizenship, whilst several forms of British 
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citizenship do not even provide those who occupy that status with an automatic right to abode 
in the United Kingdom.1  
In keeping with these changes one the most remarkable development since Blackstone’s day 
– no less in the UK than other jurisdictions – has been a growth in the scale of the presence of 
non-citizens, whether as visitors or denizens, living alongside native residents; hence despite 
the efforts of migration managers to exclude unwelcome goats, the goatish population, many 
but by no means all of whom have the status of denizens rather than citizens,  has grown 
steadily larger, has become a steadily more salient, as well as an ever more firmly 
institutionalised feature of every Euro-American jurisdiction. Nor are such developments in 
any way exceptional on a global scale. In many of the oil-rich jurisdictions in the Gulf region, 
the scale of the denizen population massively exceeds that of native citizens. 
The increasing salience of denizenship 
The driving force behind these developments is plain to see: it is the outcome of ever more 
determined efforts by fully fledged citizens to ensure that in the midst of current processes of 
globalisation – on which their position of prosperity substantially depends – is not eroded by 
the entrepreneurial efforts of upstart competitors from below. The contradictions which have 
erupted as a result of their efforts to protect their interests are currently showing up at all sorts 
of levels: one of the most egregious is that between the world’s largest debtor (a jurisdiction 
which also still considers itself to occupy a position of natural hegemony in global affairs), 
and an ‘upstart’ from below whose industrial prowess has enabled it to emerge as the world’s 
largest creditor. However it is not so much the process of global dialectics which the current 
phase of globalisation which I wish to explore in this context, but rather a more parochial 
manifestation of those self-same processes: those which have developed within the 
boundaries of contemporary jurisdictions as they have struggled with the consequences of a 
further distinctive feature of globalisation ‘from below’: long-distance migration.  
There are two more or less independent driving forces behind this phenomenon. On the one 
hand acute shortages of labour, particularly at the menial and unskilled end of the labour 
market, which have recently emerged in all the world’s most prosperous jurisdictions; and on 
the other the entrepreneurial initiatives deployed by the residents of more impoverished 
jurisdictions to take advantage of the opportunities for rapid upward mobility potentially 
available both for themselves and their offspring should they manage to establish themselves 
                                            
1  Those in this position include British Overseas Citizens and British Protected Persons.  
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as permanent residents in more affluent jurisdictions elsewhere. Such opportunities only 
became seriously available as a consequence of the economic boom which most Euro-
American jurisdictions experienced in the aftermath of the Second World War. This was also 
a period in which there appeared to be no immediate challenges Euro-America’s position of 
global hegemony, so much so that it was widely assumed that this would be a win-win 
situation for all concerned. Immigration ‘from below’ provided a means of filling gaps in the 
labour market quickly and cheaply; meanwhile migrant workers, however poorly paid they 
might be by the local standards, could fill their pockets with gold, at least in terms of 
expectations in their native jurisdictions. However very little attention was paid to the long-
term implications of these initiatives, whose structural implications in due course proved to 
be closely akin to those which emerged in the South African system of apartheid. However it 
took some time before these parallels to become apparent.  
Settlers from Britain’s former imperial possessions who arrived in the UK in the nineteen 
fifties and sixties found themselves in a remarkably privileged position, at least as far as their 
legal status was concerned. Given that the ideological assumptions of Empire were still 
firmly entrenched in English, their formal status as Commonwealth citizen, they assumed the 
status of British subjects the moment they stepped ashore in the UK. As a result they not only 
enjoyed unrestricted rights of entry into the UK, but having done so acquired just the same 
civic rights as British citizens of native birth. Hence even if there was a sense in which they 
were de facto denizens, given that few of the early settlers had any immediate intention of 
taking up permanent residence in the UK, and even fewer members of the indigenous 
majority expected them to do so, most not only settled down in their new environment, and in 
due course exercised their unrestricted rights to call their wives and children to join them. 
However that state of affairs did not last long. From 1962 onwards a series of Commonwealth 
Immigration Acts steadily eroded the privileges of ‘New Commonwealth’ citizens (or in 
other words those of non-European origin), which were eventually comprehensively 
eliminated in the British Nationality Act of 1981.  But whilst the principal driving force 
behind these legislative changes – together with many additional Immigration Acts which 
have been brought into force since 1981 – was to bring the inflow of non-European settlers to 
a halt, or failing that to ensure that those who succeeded in using well-established paths of 
chain migration to enter the UK come what may would only be admitted as denizens rather 
than citizens, the inflow has continued almost unabated. As migration managers in many 
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other jurisdictions have also discovered, once a migratory inflow becomes well established, it 
is exceedingly difficult to bring it to a halt.  
Alterity and the Legitimation of Exclusion 
That these legislative measures were defensive in character is quite clear: their introduction 
became inevitable as successive Governments became aware the popular demands for the 
introduction of such measure were so intense that they could hope to stay in power if they 
failed to do so. These popular demands saw the migrant ‘threat’ as being as two-fold in 
character. In the first instance was widely held that as migrants and their offspring became 
increasingly numerous their presence was placing an unacceptable strain on scarce resources 
– especially in terms of jobs, housing and public services – to the detriment of the interests, 
and indeed of the rights, of members of the indigenous population. Secondly, and just 
importantly, the steady growth of ethnic colonies precipitated further waves of hostility to the 
migrants’ intrinsic alterity. At the outset this was directed at primarily at their physiological 
alterity, but as time passed it began to lodge ever more firmly on the new minorities’ dogged 
determination to maintain a sense of social, religious and cultural distinctiveness, with the 
consequence – or so it was argued – that the very integrity of the established socio-cultural 
order was being put seriously at risk. To put the matter plainly, it is the additional dimensions 
of plurality which the alien newcomers, and most especially those of Muslim origin, have 
introduced into the fabric of Euro-America’s established Christian and post-Christian social 
order which have become the focus of intense popular hostility. 
These developments were not unique to Britain. Rather they have been repeated, often with 
greater levels of intensity, across the length and breadth of Western Europe. This has led to 
some radical changes in public policy. In the British case they have resulted in a laissez-faire 
attitude towards the minorities’ tendency to maintain a sense of cultural distinctiveness, 
subsequently identified ‘multi-culturalism’ to be abandoned in favour of a much more 
explicitly assimilationist policy of ‘community cohesion’. (Ballard 2007). This newfound 
initiative has had many dimensions, including 
 Efforts by the authorities to persuade the minorities to abandon the most egregious 
aspects of their religio-cultural traditions, as for example in their efforts to promote 
‘moderate Islam’. 
 Efforts to criminalise unacceptable dimensions of minority practice, including forced 
marriage, honour killings, cousin-marriages, out-door cremations, people-smuggling 
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and the use of hawala networks as a means of implementing transjurisdictional value 
transfers.  
 The construction of ever more stringent tests of assimilative achievements – including 
fluency in the English language, knowledge of British constitutional history and its 
associated cultural practices, and evidence of civic involvement with majority 
institutions – as a prerequisite for naturalisation, or in other words of conversion of 
one’s legal status from that of a denizen to that of a fully fledged citizen.  
To the extent that a substantial proportion of new minority population have resisted these 
pressures to conform, and that chain migration has been sustained willy nilly, albeit on a 
reduced scale, the scale of the de jure denizen presence in Britain is expanding rapidly. That 
is not to suggest that the majority of members of the new minority presence in Britain have 
such a status. Most entered (or were born in) Britain before the gates of exclusion slammed 
shut. Nevertheless many of them remain indistinguishable from mere denizens in the eyes of 
the indigenous majority, if only because they so often highlight, rather than seek to cover up, 
their on-going commitment to socio-cultural alterity.  
Why, though, should the new minorities be continuing to act in such an intransigent fashion? 
From a majority perspective their behaviour seems nothing less than perverse, since their 
strategic choices appear to have had entirely counter-productive consequences. However that 
is to consider what is best understood as a dialectic process from one side of the fence. Once 
a subaltern perspective ‘from below’ is brought into focus, a radically different picture 
emerges. As I argued over thirty years ago 
Over the past ten years, 'immigration" has become a political issue which has 
generated a great deal of heated argument. Many people now believe that there are 
too many 'immigrants' in Britain and that their presence constitutes a problem. British 
society has become polyethnic in the last two decades, and the new ethnic colonies 
are feared not only because they symbolise material competition by inferiors but also 
because they appear to pose a threat to the integrity of well-understood cultural 
patterns and institutions. The more these changes are regarded as unacceptable 
and, hence, generate open hostility on the part of the white majority, the more 
strongly ethnic colonies will reinforce themselves. (Ballard 1977: 55) 
The dynamics of ethnic colonisation ‘from below’ 
Much of the recent discussion of the dynamics of long distance migration ‘from below’ in 
both official and academic circles has been remarkably myopic in character. All too often the 
capacity of migrants to act as agents in their own cause is overlooked, as is their capacity to 
tap into the resources embedded in their (widely varying) cultural traditions as a source of 
entrepreneurial inspiration, thereby to make the most of every opportunity that comes their 
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way. Hence whilst ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors remain, as ever, the most potent driving forces 
behind the overall dynamics of long-distance migration, in any given diasporic context those 
basic parameters are further conditioned by a wide range of additional factors grounded in 
and articulated through self-generated initiatives developed and deployed on an 
entrepreneurial basis by the members of each such diasporic network.  
The issue of networks in this context is crucial. Only a tiny minority of migrants – especially 
in the case of those pressing upwards ‘from below’ – set off into the blue on a wholly 
individualistic basis. Instead the vast majority follow in the footsteps of a known predecessor, 
and in doing so aim for a known destination; and when they arrive at their destination, they 
invariably get in touch with their kinsfolk back home, even if they were shipwrecked along 
the way and find themselves ensconced at a destination quite different from that at which 
they had originally reached. From this perspective it is worth remembering that right from the 
outset, processes of long-distance migration also give rise to long-distance networks of 
communication, primarily running along intrinsically parochial linkages of kinship; moreover 
if the news about the opportunities from overseas destinations is positive, it soon stimulates 
an outflow of entrepreneurially minded young men to each such destination, news of whose 
successes stimulates yet more successors to follow in their footsteps in a pattern of chain 
migration (Ballard 2009a). 
Chain migration of this sort has many consequences. In the first place it leads to the 
construction of what I have found it convenient to describe as ‘escalators’: socially and 
culturally grounded networks of reciprocity running from specific localities (villages, descent 
groups and so forth) in less prosperous parts of the globe, which facilitate the swift and 
efficient delivery of their ‘passengers’ to one or other of the specific locations in which 
members of that group have established themselves overseas. Whilst the construction of such 
escalators was unproblematic prior to the erection of exclusionary border controls, recent 
legislative initiatives have criminalised these practices. As a result anyone who is identified 
as facilitating such practices is currently in danger of being charged with the offence of 
‘people-smuggling’.  
A further consequence of the construction of such escalators – which are still very much in 
operation, despite ever more intensive efforts by migration managers to bring them to a halt – 
is that they deliver large numbers of people of similar backgrounds into equally specific 
localities overseas. Hence they actively facilitate the growth of ethnic colonies, whose 
members typically make strenuous efforts to reconstruct all the most significant social, 
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cultural, religious and familial institutions of the homelands in order to facilitate their 
survival in their new, alien, and often far from welcoming social and cultural environment. It 
is precisely this tendency of the settlers to look after each other on their own terms, and to 
utilise the resources of their cultural heritage to carve new niches for themselves to press their 
way forward in their new environment come what may – a typical feature of all mass 
migratory processes – to which members of the indigenous population of Euro-America have 
recently begun to object with such vigour.  
However a third salient characteristic feature of these escalators – their capacity to facilitate 
circular no less than one-way trips – is proving to be yet more significant still. Riding on the 
back of the revolution in communications technology, the transjurisdictional networks to 
which these escalators gave rise now facilitate the circulation of information, assets and 
personnel as between all the many points around the globe at which the members of that 
network have established a local presence. As a result each such diasporic network is in a 
position to take advantage of globalisation on the same strategic basis as that adopted by 
multi-national corporations. In a manner which runs entirely parallel with their massive 
counterparts operating ‘from above’, members of diasporic networks are in a position to 
redistribute assets, ideas and personnel around the globe in whatever manner they find 
strategically advantageous, regardless of the nominal constraints imposed by jurisdictional 
boundaries. As a result these networks have also gained the capacity to act ‘translegally’, as 
Beck (2006:72) has put it. No less than their counterparts operating hegemonically from 
above, their location in transjurisdictional space provides members of diasporic networks 
with endless opportunities to evade, and hence to subvert, the control which more parochially 
oriented national jurisdictions might seek to impose on their transjurisdictional activities.   
However one must be careful not to press this analogy too far. Multinational corporations 
have a great deal of political and economic clout; they carry out their business on a 
contractual basis, their accounts are audited by one or other of the four remaining global 
accountancy firms, and they hire teams of expensive lawyers to ensure that their operations, 
no matter how arcane they may be, can be represented as lawful. However South Asian 
migrants’ transjurisdictional networks – unless they happen to have been constructed by a 
Mittal, an Ambani or a Tata – enjoy no such privileges. Worse still, their networks are most 
usually constructed around informal reciprocities of mutual trust, rather than around formally 
constituted relationships of contract. As a result they are acutely vulnerable to prosecution on 
the grounds of non-compliance with regulatory requirements, given that it can readily be 
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argued that such non-compliance is merely a cover for some sort of transjurisdictional 
criminal conspiracy.  
Borders and transgression  
In so far as the central objective of constructing borders is to control, and very often to tax, 
the passage of goods and persons as and when they move from one jurisdiction to another, all 
such borders invariably attract, and indeed create, a class of persons who have developed 
strategies by means of which evade such restrictions. Smugglers and borders are natural 
partners. Moreover the stricter the degree of border management, and the greater the 
advantages  are likely to accrue the evaders of such controls, and the more complex and 
inventive the tactics of would-be transgressors will tend to become; moreover the more 
successful such strategies of evasion become, the more elaborate the efforts to defend the 
border will tend to become. Physical obstacles such as walls and fences become higher and 
longer, and/or an ever more intensive systems of scrutiny aimed at distinguishing legitimate 
sheep from illegitimate goats will begin to be devised. So far as I am aware no known borders 
are smuggler-free. Tactics vary. Some are quite straightforward: dangling sufficient volumes 
of cash before relatively impoverished border guards is often a means of persuading them 
temporarily to look the other way. Tunnels can be dug, and gates can be cut in fences. 
However, the most strategic advantageous option by far is to find a loop-hole by means of 
which to facilitate the passage of goods, assets, ideas and personnel across the disjunction on 
a legitimate basis.  
The dialectics of borders and border control in a globalising world 
In the light of such considerations it is worth remembering that the dialectics of border 
control are in no sense a novel phenomenon. Ever since states began to gain the sufficient 
capacity to create, and to exercise control over, fixed geographical borders – a process which 
more than four millennia ago – border guards and those seeking to evade them have been 
playing ever more elaborate games of cat and mouse with one another. As the centuries have 
passed, both the location and character of jurisdictional disjunctions have been subjected to a 
bewildering range of changes, driven, amongst other things, by the ever burgeoning progress 
of globalisation. It follows that to make good sense of these developments, including those 
with which we currently find ourselves confronted, it is essential to consider them in the 
context of the longue durée.  
  
14
It was not long before the city-states of the ancient world found themselves swept up into 
ever wider imperial jurisdictions. As a result the relatively parochial jurisdictions were 
swiftly subsumed within much more extensive administrative units, whose leaders regularly 
went to war with one another whenever and wherever their geo-political interests clashed. 
But as the tale of Ozimandias reminds us, even the mightiest Empires only enjoyed a limited 
lifespan. Imperial boundaries came and went along with the regimes which established and 
sought to defend them; and in the aftermath of their collapse, innumerable more parochial 
jurisdictions emerged – until they, too, were swept up into yet another imperial structure. 
From this perspective the expansion of European empires on a global scale from the 
seventeenth century onwards was not, in itself, a novel phenomenon. Nevertheless two 
features of these developments served to distinguish them from their predecessors. First their 
expansion was not, for the most part, at the expense of their immediate geographical 
neighbours: theirs was a process of overseas expansion which, by the beginning of the 
twentieth century, had subjecting close to the landmass of the whole of the rest of the globe to 
the control of one European jurisdiction or another. But these edifices also turned out to be 
unstable. Largely as a result of two immensely destructive phases of global warfare, 
precipitated as much by internecine quarrels between established Empires as by desperate 
efforts to get to the table by those who felt they had been left out, all these edifices collapsed 
during the course of the twentieth century – leading to the emergence of a multitude of newly 
articulated nation states, all with their own (often vigorously contended) borders. 
However much more was also changing as all this was going one. Thanks to their ruthless 
willingness of to deploy force of arms to get their own way, together with their success in 
mechanising the initially significantly more technologically advanced, but still labour 
intensive, manufacturing achievements of India and China, European jurisdictions, led most 
spectacularly by Britain, were able to reinvent themselves as the hubs of global trading 
networks as the second phase of globalisation2 took off, to their immense material advantage. 
Moreover whilst administrative disjunctions between each of these imperial structures were 
ever more strongly marked, and were often a causus belli, those within them were routinely 
dismantled in the interests of ‘free trade’. The result was a new world order in which the 
inhabitants of Euro-American hubs grew increasingly prosperous, whilst the inhabitants of 
                                            
2  In my view the first phase of globalisation took off in the shape of ancient patterns of long-distance 
trade between China, India and what in due course became the Islamic world, and which reached it 




their possessions elsewhere became steadily impoverished, in many cases absolutely as well 
as relatively. If most of these imperial structures celebrated the wonders of boundaryless free 
trade, they were careful only to implement this program within the limits of their own 
parochial/global jurisdiction, and to organise it in such a way that the benefits of the whole 
exercise were concentrated at the hub, to the necessary disadvantage of the periphery.  
But whilst remnants of the structures generated during the second phase of globalisation 
remain in place, they are being steadily undermined by those more characteristic of the third, 
in which the BRICS, led by China and India, have begun to replace Euro-America as the 
global hubs for manufacturing activity.  Suddenly the world’s prosperous regimes have found 
themselves on the defensive as a result of the emergence of transgressive competitors from 
below, and hey presto!, the rules of the games are changing. Only a decade ago the 
Washington Consensus was still firmly in place, such that key agencies such as IMF, the 
World Bank and the WTO were still urging jurisdictions throughout the ‘developing world’ – 
or in other words Euro-America’s former colonial possessions – to remove all their tariff 
barriers in order to promote free trade on a global basis. But with the onset of the twenty-first 
all this has been turned on its head. In the aftermath of 9/11, and above all its own self-
generated credit crunch, the United States and its immediate European acolytes have changed 
tack, and have set about reinforcing their own borders in an effort to keep these new sources 
‘unfair competition’ at bay.  
Viewed from the longue durée, there is nothing particularly novel about such swings of the 
pendulum, and the emergence of a new set of dialectics of closure. Nevertheless there is 
much that is distinctive about current developments, largely as a result of the onrush of 
process of globalisation which have precipitated this very outcome. Like it or not all the 
world’s economies are now interlinked by trading networks of unprecedented scale, so much 
that a significant down-turn global trade would have a catastrophic impact on every current 
economic jurisdiction – with the possible exception of North Korea. But if long-distance 
trade in goods and services has become the contemporary world’s economic lifeblood, these 
activities are sustained by an even more globalised, and hence footloose, capital markets. 
Now that an instant global messaging system is in place, any jurisdiction which seeks 
seriously to constrain the transfer of value across its borders readily be brought to its knees. 
In such a world, jurisdictional closure has become an ever more challenging task.  
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Migration management in the third phase of globalisation  
No contemporary jurisdiction, no matter how powerful, appears to have the capacity to mount 
a serious to challenge those institutional networks through which processes of globalisation 
from above are implemented. Any such threats are met by open blackmail: that their whole 
operation will be floated off to some more welcoming jurisdiction elsewhere, sometimes to 
India, China or even London, but better still to exotic locations such as the Cayman Islands, 
whose whole economy revolves around acting as tax and regulation-free havens for the 
wealth of individuals and corporations whose business is overwhelmingly implemented 
elsewhere. But whilst those operating transgressively ‘from below’ are having a much 
tougher time as they seek to make the most of global opportunities, those seeking to prevent 
them from so doing found that meeting the objectives they have been set is far from easy. 
In the first place the underlying economic logic which drives the transjurisdictional migratory 
movements which they are seeking to contain works systematically against their objectives; 
moreover there is every reason to expect that this will continue so long as there are unfilled 
niches in the employment markets of prosperous jurisdictions which the indigenes are 
unwilling to occupy. That seems unlikely to occur any time soon. Secondly, and just as 
significantly, the prospect of the authorities being able to ensure that those recruited to fill 
these niches can all be permanently restricted to the status of readily re-exportable denizens 
seems equally unlikely, at least so long as chain migration remains a potent force. The 
unfortunate fact of the matter – at least from the perspective of the architects of migration 
management – is that migrants are not just agents in their own cause, but that their ethnic 
associates have already established substantial bridgeheads within the walls of the 
jurisdiction. As a result new arrivals – whether or not their mode of entry into the jurisdiction 
was licit in character – can expect a friendly welcome from predecessors of a similar origin to 
their own; worse still, the majority of their predecessors have by now become gained access 
to local citizenship.  
All this presents migration managers with further headaches. How, in the light of all this, can 
they find a legal means of ensuring that goats-turned-sheep can be thwarted in their efforts to 
use the privileges associated with citizenship to facilitate the passage of further goats – most 
usually their own kinsfolk – through the exclusionary sieves of the jurisdictions carefully 
constructed boundaries? Their efforts to do so have given rise to complex strategies designed 
to undermine the capacity of goats turned sheep have gained legitimate access, migration 
managers become ever more concerned to subvert the objectives of border control. This has 
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proved to be an extremely tricky task, given the need to respect rights to which fully fledged 
citizens have inescapable access on the one hand, and to ensure that the measures taken will 
not be struck down by the courts as illegitimate on the other.  During the course of the past 
decade two new, and so far highly effective, strategies by means of which these twin 
objectives can be achieved on a legitimate basis have begun to emerge. These have been 
grounded in concerns for public safety, most especially with respect to the need to implement 
effective counter-terrorist strategies; and on the other in terms of human rights, which are 
increasingly being utilised as a vehicle for suggesting that many aspects of non-European 
familial and cultural practices are inherently illegitimate, such that their perpetration can 
readily be identified as criminal offences of one kind or another.  
On the pernicious consequences of family life 
Given the current premises of migration management, anything which provides labour 
migrants with a means of stabilising their condition of denizenship is regarded as being as 
unwelcome as it is counter-productive, since it compromises their position as mobile (and 
hence readily disposable) units of labour. Hence whilst there is no objection to them leaving 
their familial dependants back home in their countries of origin, or to their propensity to remit 
a substantial portion of their earnings back home to support them, any sets which they might 
take towards involvement in familial entanglements at their destination – whether in the form 
efforts to facilitate the entry of further kinsfolk through the jurisdictional boundary, or by 
creating de novo ties of kinship or marriage within it are regarded as unwelcome. 
Examples of remedies to problems of this kind are readily available. South Africa led the way 
in this field by using the Group Areas Act to create internal jurisdictional boundaries, 
accompanied by a regime of border controls and passes which required labour migrants from 
the Bantustans to return to their homeland as soon as they ceased to fulfil a positive economic 
role in the white economy. The challenge facing contemporary migration managers is to find 
a means of precipitating a similar outcome, but on a more legitimate basis, such that 
arguments that they are constructing yet another apartheid regime can readily be repudiated.  
The solution, so far as I can see, has been to rejig the logic on the basis of which the South 
African authorities legitimated of apartheid. Whilst the core principle on the basis of which 
jurisdictional disjunctions around apartheid was constructed, and hence legitimated, was 
explicitly racial, this was also accompanied by a parallel ethno-cultural subtext: that these 
measures would serve to ensure that the civilised world of white South Africa would not be 
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undermined by the forces of primitive African barbarism. Meanwhile this was ultimately 
underpinned by a third, but usually unspoken, strategic premise: that the whole edifice served 
to protect of members of a privileged elite from the transgressive activities of unwelcome 
competitors from below. Against that background, the solutions currently being devised by 
European migration managers simply reverse the order of the first two principles, such that 
their exclusionary sieves are formally tuned to operate on an ethno-cultural, rather than an 
explicitly racial, basis. 
It has taken some time for this policy to emerge fully-fledged from its chrysalis. In the UK, 
migration managers have been wrestling with issues of family and kinship, and above all that 
of marriage, for close to half a century. When immigration controls were first introduced in 
1962, their aim was to constrain the inflow of ‘primary migrants’: young adult males seeking 
employment. But since those entering the UK from its former imperial possessions acquired 
the same legal status as indigenous citizens the moment they stepped ashore, no restraint was 
placed, or indeed could be placed, on their right to reunite their families at their destination.  
Since then much has changed. On the one hand the privileged position of Commonwealth 
citizens has long since been stripped away, to be replaced by an ever-lengthening series of 
administrative hurdles in the way of access to naturalisation – leading, amongst other things, 
to a rapid growth in the number of persons trapped in various forms of denizenship. 
Meanwhile all manner of initiatives have been introduced in efforts to undermine the efforts 
of members of the new minorities, whether their status was as citizens or denizens, to 
exercise their (steadily shrinking) rights to reunite their families in the UK.  
The first step along this path was to restrict such rights of reunion to the dependants of 
established settlers, so entry to the UK was restricted to children still under the age of 18, and 
adult dependants over the age of retirement; these restrictions were further reinforced at an 
administrative level by ever more intrusive demands for documentation, and even when that 
was available for further proof that the documents were authentic, and/or whether those 
involved were actually related as claimed. Nevertheless it still left a further loophole wide 
open: marriage. Once again all manner of administrative obstacles were introduced with the 
objective of curbing the inflow along this route. These included virginity tests and the 
‘Primary Purpose’ rule (Sachdeva 199?), which required incoming spouses to prove a 
negative: that their primary purpose in getting married to UK-based spouse had been 
something other than gaining entry into the UK. In due course all these initiatives fell by the 
wayside as inoperable. DNA testing the vast majority of ‘not related as claimed’ decisions 
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were unfounded, whilst Primary Purpose rule was abandoned in the face of acute legal 
unease, reinforced by the prospect that it would fall foul of the provisions of the European 
Convention of Human Rights.  
Nevertheless in a viable means of squaring this particular circle emerged in the opening of 
the twentieth century. Faced with the challenge of finding a way of to establish the legitimacy 
of an exclusionary practice whose objective was manifestly discriminatory, European 
migration managers spotted a means of going for the jugular: if they could devise a set of 
immigration rules whose purpose was ostensibly grounded in efforts to promote and defend 
human rights, rather than in efforts to trash them, they could turn the tables on their most 
voluble critics. Hence the most salient feature of twenty-first century strategies has been to 
articulate, and hence to legitimate, exclusionary strategies on a positive basis, on the grounds 
that the new measures had been designed to protect members of minority communities who 
might otherwise have found themselves victims of patriarchy, forced marriages, female 
genital mutilation, honour killings and other such backward and exploitative traditional 
human wrongs.   
Squaring the circle: the role of Unni Wikan and her allies 
How, though, was the jump from crusading effort to right – or at least mitigate – such wrongs 
to rejigging the logistics of border control to be achieved? After all those responsible for 
managing the inflow of personnel across jurisdictional borders did not have judicial powers, 
and hence were in position impose sanctions on the perpetrators of such criminal and 
criminalisationable activities. Hence the inspiration for such initiatives did not emerge 
directly from debates about how the authorities might implement border controls on a more 
effective basis, but rather from a parallel debate about how far those who had already 
managed to establish themselves within the borders, sometimes as denizens, and not 
infrequently as citizens, were actually organizing their domestic lives on a civilized basis.  
The first serious stone thrown into the pond from this direction was launched by Unni Wikan, 
in the shape of her much quoted book Generous Betrayal: the Politics of Culture in the New 
Europe. On the basis of a series of small number of narrowly focussed case studies of young 
Muslim women whose parents or husbands had settled in Norway, but who subsequently 
found themselves in severe difficulties in domestic contexts, Wikan developed an elaborate 
series of arguments in which she suggested that these young women had been let down by, 
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and indeed had been comprehensively betrayed as a result of, the Norwegian state’s ultra-
liberal response to cultural diversity.  
Having approvingly quoted a comment by Finkielkraut to the effect that  
Attempting to minimize the brutal experience of leaving home, we turn immigrants over, 
bound hand and foot, to other members of their collective community living abroad. In so 
doing we end up limiting the application of the right of man only to societies identified with 
the West, believing all the time that we have expanded these rights by giving peoples of other 
traditions the chance to live by the laws of their own cultures.  
On this basis Wikan goes on to argue that 
Multiculturalism is the position that all cultures are of equal value and should be granted 
equal respect; hence all should have an equal place within the colorful community. But if 
people are presumed to prefer their own kind and to take pride in their own distinctive roots, 
how can they be expected to grant each other equal respect? Multiculturalists try to resolve 
their conundrum by preaching cultural relativism. People must be taught to respect other 
cultures and see the value of their traditions and products. And the place to begin is in school: 
teach children that all cultures are equally deserving of respect. As we have seen, this position 
has informed Norwegian immigration policy; and it is one for which Aisha, among others, 
paid the price. Equally worthy of respect – or you are a racist! The deadly word has been used 
to make people subservient to cultural relativism in many cases where culture was not worthy 
of respect. (Wikan 2002: 145-6) 
For Wikan, and many for others who have followed in her ultra-feminist footsteps, religion in 
general, and Islam in particular, not just committed to the suppression of freedom of thought 
and personal liberty, but also to unconstrained patriarchy, which has in turn precipitated the 
personal disasters which she highlights in her largely uncontextualised case studies. That the 
personal disasters of the kind she describes deserve our careful attention is incontestable. I, 
too, have encountered such incidents in the course of my fieldwork, and have acquired all 
manner of insights have prepared expert reports for use in criminal proceedings precipitated 
by more than thirty incidents of familial homicide involving South Asian settlers and their 
offspring in the UK. However I do not share her conclusions (Ballard 2011).  
What is striking about Wikan’s monograph, is the certainty with which she allocates the 
blame for incidents of this kind. She has two interlinked targets: on the one hand the 
oppressive, authoritarian, patriarchal and honour-driven traditions which Muslim settlers 
have brought with them to Norway, and on the other their lily-livered betrayers: the 
libertarian anti-racists who could not bring themselves to condemn the inhumane and 
oppressive religious and cultural practices which the settlers had brought with them. My own 
conclusion with respect to these issues, as well as those of many other anthropologists with a 
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similarly lengthy degree of ethnographic experience, differed radically from those of Wikan. 
Nevertheless her arguments touched a sensitive button, and her monograph soon became a 
much-publicised best seller. 
It achieved that status as a result of attracting the enthusiastic attention of two hitherto quite 
separate audiences: firstly amongst those of a more or less radical feminist persuasion, who 
took the view that the plight of women in societies in which gender divisions remain 
significantly more strongly marked than is currently the case in indigenous Euro-American 
contexts are the outcome of a particularly egregious – and hence intrinsically intolerable – 
form of patriarchy; and secondly, and in many ways even more significantly, her work also 
attracted the attention members of that section of the population whose members were deeply 
hostile to the very presence of settlers of non-European origin in their midst, on the grounds 
discussed earlier: namely that they newcomers represented a threat to the integrity of the 
established socio-cultural order. This otherwise unlikely alliance proved to have explosive 
consequences. Once xenophobia has been legitimated on progressive/feminist grounds, 
hitherto subterranean feelings of hostility towards the new minorities which had hitherto been 
concealed for fear that their articulation would be read as signs of irrational prejudice could at 
long last be put to one side. In the popular imagination Wikan, together with a small number 
of radical feminists who followed in her footsteps, had revealed another side of the coin: that 
if left untamed, the religious and cultural features were bound to become an ever more 
serious threat to the progressive, egalitarian and liberal premises which underpinned the 
established socio-cultural order. Expressions of xenophobia, or to be more precise, hostility 
to the new minorities’ maintenance of a sense of ethno-religious distinctiveness suddenly 
gained legitimacy, especially in the aftermath of the events of 9/11. As this occurred three 
otherwise largely unconnected features of the minority presence – the construction of 
minarets, the adoption of the hijab and the phenomenon of ‘honour killing’ came to be 
regarded as symbols of the unacceptable character minority alterity, on the grounds that they 
encapsulated the grounds on which the values which they symbolised were an aberration 
from, and indeed a threat to, the civilised standards of the jurisdictions within which the 
newcomers had established themselves.  
With such considerations in mind, Wikan goes on, in the final chapter of her book, to 




The obligations of citizenship 
As we saw earlier Blackstone was quite clear as to how this matter stood in England towards 
the end of the eighteenth century: 
Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the dominions of the crown of England, that 
is, within the allegiance of the king; and aliens, such as are born out of it. Allegiance is the tie, 
which binds the subject to the king, in return for that protection which the king affords the 
subject. 
Much has changed since then. As monarchies constructed around the feudal concept of 
allegiance of their subjects the sovereign have steadily been replaced by nation-states 
constructed around the republican premise of citizenship, the concept of subjecthood has 
become steadily more anachronistic. We are all citizens now. But just what makes us citizens, 
now that the notion that we acquire the rights and duties of allegiance to a monarch as 
‘natural’ consequence of having been born within the jurisdiction over which he holds sway 
has been swept away? 
 In the UK, although not in the United States, the concept of jus soli was eliminated at a 
stroke in Nationality Act of 1981. That same act also redefined the status Britain’s overseas 
subjects (a legacy of Britain’s former imperial jurisdiction) as British Overseas Citizens, 
whose citizenship is deficient in one significant respect: such persons no longer had 
automatic right to enter, and still less to settle, in the jurisdiction in whose name their 
passports were issued. Furthermore the acquisition of British citizenship was likewise 
restricted solely to locally-born children of at least one of whose parents was a fully fledged 
citizen. Those infants who did not meet that requirement joined the ranks of denizens.  
Remarkably enough, however, to this day the concept British citizenship is in formal terms 
almost entirely restricted to its holder’s immigration status. It has nothing to say about a yet 
more pressing issue: namely just what is it that binds the citizen to the state – and the state to 
the citizen? In other words what are their respective rights and duties, now that the feudally 
grounded concept of allegiance has been swept away?  At least since 1789 the answer to that 
one in republican contexts has (at least in principle) quite clear: the feudal principles would 
henceforward be reversed. The state was from now on to be regarded as a creation of ‘we, the 
people’, or in other words of its free and autonomous citizens: the feudal concept of 
subjecthood was consequently consigned to the dustbin of history in the face of the 
burgeoning forces of democracy. 
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However this vision also raised an even more pressing question: just who were ‘the people’ 
on whose behalf such newly constituted democratic edifices were to be constructed? 
However much the revolutionaries of the late eighteenth century may have been inspired by 
the Rights of Man, their outlook was far from universalistic. In addition to overlooking the 
rights of half of humankind, as Mary Wollstonecraft promptly pointed out, they were also 
committed nationalists. As was abundantly clear in the case of the exemplary pioneer, France, 
the democratic states which were a product of the premises of the enlightenment would of 
necessity be nation states, each of which were bound together not so much by the accident of 
birth, but rather as a result of their citizens’ common (and distinctive) moral, cultural and 
linguistic traditions. That was what la patrie was all about. But if nation states were by 
definition inclusive of all those loyal to the principles and premises of la patrie, they were 
equally exclusive of all those who outside that moral universe. Citizenship became an ipso 
facto national phenomenon. 
This is precisely the foundation of the arguments which Wikan develops in the final chapter 
of Generous Betrayal. Utilising her routine tactic of quoting the opinions of others, she 
begins by quoting the verdict in a case in which she herself had acted as an expert witness: 
The case arises from culture conflicts. But it is the parents who have chosen to live in 
Norway. After many years of residence here, they are fully aware of how Norwegian society 
functions, for better or for worse. That they wish to maintain the customs of their country of 
birth is unobjectionable, as long as these customs do not come into conflict with Norwegian 
law. Children can develop in ways that are different from what the parents hope for. But that 
is the risk in having children, and – not least – in letting them grow up in a different culture. 
The parents have made a choice as to which country their children will be moulded by. That 
circumstance may have such consequences as resulting in the case currently before the court. 
Using violence and forcible deprivation of freedom of movement as an answer is 
unacceptable.  
The court also notes that the family continues to live in Norway and that they have two 
children below school age who will grow up here. Therefore, there must be aspects of 
Norwegian society that they, in sum, perceive as more positive than the negative ones.  
 On this basis she goes on to conclude: 
The verdict was a clear statement of what the Norwegian state demands of its citizens, 
according to the law. And it was historic. It was the first time that the Norwegian courts 
declared – and in blunt language – what citizenship entails. (Wikan 2002: 191-2) 
What citizenship entails, in other words, is the adoption of, and conformity to, the normative 
ideals and cultural premises of one’s fellow-citizens. However there is no sign that either 
Wikan or the judge wished or intended that proposition to be taken to the extreme: given the 
priority which Norwegians give to personal freedom, there is little or no support for the view 
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that Norway should aim to become a society which was absolutely homogenous in character. 
Rather the essence of current thinking – not just in Norway, but throughout the Euro-
American world – that diversity should be accommodated as a matter of course, but only 
within limits. As a result the issue in the contexts with which we are concerned here is not so 
much the existence of diversity per se¸ but rather just how much diversity the state and its 
citizens should be prepared to accommodate. Hence the substantive issue in question in 
Nadia’s case was whether or not Nadia’s parents were entitled to take their daughter to 
Morocco to arrange her marriage against her wishes. The court decided that they were not. 
Moreover as Wikan is at pains to emphasise, this case was not a one-off issue. All the cases 
she highlights are concerned with familial issues, and above all as to whether it can ever be 
legitimate for the hierarchically organised relationships of mutual reciprocity in terms of 
which South Asian, Middle Eastern and North African families are routinely constructed to 
be allowed out-trump the commitments to individual liberty and personal freedom which lie 
at the heart of the post-enlightenment premises which underpin the Norwegian socio-cultural 
order. With this in mind it is striking the Wikan does not bother to discuss the merits and 
demerits of the differing forms of family organisation to which the differing sets of familial 
premises and practices give rise (see Shaw 2000, Ballard 2008); instead she takes it for 
granted that the quality of life within families constructed around post-enlightenment 
premises of personal freedom are intrinsically superior to those grounded in what she 
dismissively identifies as the subjugation of women. She was not alone in taking this 
position: rather her arguments, as well as of those advanced by those who have followed in 
her footsteps have served to legitimise a wave of hostility towards the new minority presence 
which began to gather force during the closing decades of the twentieth century, and which 
burst forth as a tsunami in the aftermath of 9/11, with members of Muslim communities 
(which now form my far the largest component of the non-European presence in western 
Europe) as their principal target.  
Humanitarian intervention on behalf of the oppressed  
The onset of the twenty-first century has witnessed a remarkable turnaround. Just as Euro-
America has begun to face up to the prospect that it might be toppled from the position of 
global hegemony which it has enjoyed for the past two centuries, many of its inhabitants have 
fallen prey to a fit of concern about the situation in which many non-European inhabitants of 
the globe find themselves, not so much as a result of imperial policies, but as a result of the 
oppressive and exploitative character of the indigenous regimes to which they are subjected. 
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As result ‘humanitarian intervention’ has become the order of the day – especially, although 
by no means exclusively, with respect to Islamic jurisdictions of one kind or another. Those 
efforts are currently being ever more widely replicated within many Euro-American 
jurisdictions. How can these developments best be explained?  
Given the evangelistic character of libertarian vision around which the enlightment was 
constructed, its premises have in many respects always been a double-edged sword (Gray 
2000), for besides seeking to bring to bring liberty and freedom to its exponents, they have 
also served as a mean of legitimating efforts – and if necessary of violent efforts – to liberate 
the victims of what its proponents identified as unjustified forms of oppression elsewhere. In 
their efforts to rescue Muslim women from what they perceive as the condition of 
untrammelled and indeed religiously sanctioned subordination to which these victims so 
regularly find themselves reduced, Wikan (and her many followers) have taken up precisely 
this line of argument. They have done so setting one strand of core strand of libertarian 
thinking, namely that every human cultural tradition is grounded in its own distinctive set of 
premises and practices, each of which has to be understood in its own terms, against its 
antithesis, a strand of argument which is even more deeply entrenched in the Janus-faced 
structure of the enlightenment program: namely that when the chips are down the pursuit of 
individual liberty trumps all other considerations. If so, it follows that all constraints on 
individual freedom and personal liberty are ipso facto oppressive, and deserve to be swept 
away by the unilateral flow of history towards a better and inherently singular future (Ballard 
2009b).  
These are precisely the grounds on which she argues that a policy of respect for alterity 
constitutes a mistaken course of ‘generous betrayal’. It is an outlook which is generous in the 
sense that it accepts, and indeed respects, all forms of cultural plurality; but it is nevertheless 
an outlook which must simultaneously be viewed as a betrayal, in the sense that it overlooks, 
and indeed fails to recognise the human rights of those subjected to a huge range of Harmful 
Traditional Practices to which women entrapped in less enlightened (or in other words non-
European) cultural traditions so regularly find themselves exposed.3 From a xenophobic 
perspective, nothing was more welcome than this development. Once this trope – which was 
firmly grounded in ‘culturalist’ rather than ‘racist’ premises – was firmly established, those 
                                            
3  For critique of this whole argument which is as incisive as it is illuminating, see Winter, Bronwyn,  
Thompson, Denise and Jeffreys, Sheila(2002) 'The UN Approach to Harmful Traditional Practices', 
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 4: 1, 72 — 94 
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riding (and indeed precipitating) the tide of popular hostility to the non-European presence in 
their midst, as well to the growing salience of the Islamic world in global political processes, 
at long last had access to progressive and indeed enlightened grounds on the basis of 
legitimate their xenophobic fears. Moreover the premises of ‘generous betrayal’, together 
with its parallel insistence that what was really required in an enlightened world was 
humanitarian intervention on behalf of women who found themselves oppressed and 
suppressed by the impact Harmful Traditional Practices, provided migration managers with a 
ready means of implementing and justifying powerful new strategies of selective immigration 
control based on a pressing need to protect the human rights of women and children who are 
in danger of being transferred across jurisdictional borders against their will (Hagelund 
2008). Similar arguments have also been deployed to criminalise unacceptable dimensions of 
minority lifestyles, most especially in familial contexts, and most recently with respect to the 
issue of head coverings. Moreover the arguments have now spread well beyond the protection 
of women, with the result that ever more active steps are being taken to constrain, and 
wherever possible to outlaw, subversive financial practices such as the hawala system, 
together with equally subversive exercises aimed transgressing the tranquillity of urban 
landscapes by constructing mosques equipped with deliberately intrusive minarets.   
The marginalisation of alterity in defence of ‘civilisation’ 
In the midst of all this some ever more pressing questions have begun to emerge. Given 
current patterns of globalisation, just where do the boundaries of Europe lie, and just what 
interests do these constructions seek to sustain and protect? Are the interests being so 
defended purely material in character, or are ever more widely articulated popular demands 
that the inflow of immigrants ‘from below’ should be halted, and better still reversed, driven 
by some much more abstract concerns, such as what many of the protestors perceive as the 
defence of ‘civilization’ itself, at least in this corner of the globe? Moreover if that is indeed 
the case, just how realistic are these objectives, given the historical dynamics of the current 
phase globalisation? Is such a ‘defence of civilization’ ever likely to be successful, or is it 
merely a case of barking at the moon? Moreover even if ethnic plurality is here to stay – 
always presuming it ever went away – just what is so dreadful about such a prospect? Is such 
a prospect manifestly unliveable with in any circumstances, or is it the case that Euro-
America’s current conventional socio-cultural outlook, grounded as it is in a very particular 
interpretation of the premises of the enlightenment, has become so entangled in its vision of 
its own intrinsic superiority that it cannot conceive of living in comfortable conjunction with 
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those who construct their lives around an alternative set of premises?  These are large 
questions, and they have so far attracted far less critical attention than they deserve. It is also 
self-evident that I cannot hope to address them in any detail in the space available here, even 
though they loom in the background to everything discussed in this article: all I have done is 
to begin to break the ice in this arena by exploring these from the bottom up. I have done so 
in two complementary senses. 
 In the first place I have carefully avoided the temptation to explore these issues, and most 
especially the crucial issue of citizenship, in ideological and/or theoretical terms, and hence 
from the top down; instead I have sought to explore the way in which issues of citizenship, as 
well as of denizenship, have sprung to the fore in the current phase of globalisation, largely – 
although by no means exclusively – as a product of the ever more elaborate policies 
migration of management and border control which have by now been introduced in almost 
every jurisdiction around the globe.  
But whilst it is self-evident that the key driving force behind these initiatives is the 
competitive pressures which have erupted in a grossly unequal global order of which the 
established hegemons are rapidly losing control, I also have argued that the driving force 
behind the dialectics of boundary control has not so much been precipitated by the relative 
poverty of those who find themselves excluded from the prosperous parts of the global order, 
but rather by the entrepreneurial, and hence inherently transgressive, efforts of the hitherto 
excluded to penetrate the barriers which have hitherto precluded them from participating in 
that prosperity.  Moreover the greater and more visible their success in so doing has become, 
the greater the lengths to which the indigenous inhabitants of more privileged jurisdictions 
have gone in their efforts to exclude and marginalise these competitive transgressors ‘from 
below’.  
The Empire Strikes back 
However this dialectic has by no means been exclusively materially grounded. Right from the 
outset, the issue of ‘civilization’ has been a key component in the whole process. Whilst all 
the Empires of the ancient world were more or less comfortably plural in character, those 
which subsequently constructed during the period Euro-American global expansion were 
grounded in, and indeed actively legitimated in terms of, a much more unilateral (and hence 
anti-pluralistic) vision of civilization, in initially rooted in Christianity, subsequently 
complemented by the values of the enlightenment and neo-Darwinism. Against that 
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background it should come as no surprise that those self-same tropes, carefully revamped in a 
modernistic terms, should now be in the process of being dusted off to efforts to hold the 
barbarians at the gates as the former subjects of their now defunct empires set about striking  
back.  
Alterity – the capacity to outwit the established forces of hegemony by playing aspects of the 
game according to an alternative set of rules – has always been the one of the most effective 
weapons of the weak (Scott 1987). Once upon a time it was western Europeans who found 
themselves in that position in the global arena, but thanks to the fact that their ocean-going 
ships were built to survive the stormy seas of the north Atlantic, and were consequently able 
to bear the recoil of heavy cannon, their willingness to use the resultant firepower in a 
ruthless fashion against the ‘enemies of Christ’, their fortuitous access to ‘free money’ in the 
silver mines of Potosí, and their latter day technical inventiveness which enabled them to 
mechanise the long established  spinning, weaving, metallurgical and ceramic technologies of 
India and China, they managed to turn the tables on a global scale. A result they managed to 
establish themselves as global ‘top dogs’ by the early years of nineteenth century, and hence 
to proclaim their own socio-cultural order to be the world’s only serious form of civilization. 
However their success in pressing all other competitors so far into the margins that they 
appeared not to count did not last. During the course of the twentieth century the civilizations 
of India, China and the Islamic world all began to recover their confidence, and to use their 
own self-generated resources – no less of cultural than a material kind – to challenge Euro-
American hegemony; and by the beginning of the twenty-first century it has become 
increasingly apparent that the worm had turned. However much its indigenous inhabitants 
may seek to avert their eyes from the prospect, Euro-America can no longer take its position 
of global hegemony for granted: in an unexpected turn-around (at least from their own 
parochial perspective) the former imperial powers have suddenly found themselves playing 
on the back foot. As a result defensive strategies have become the order of the day. 
During the course on the nineteenth and twentieth century processes of globalisation were 
overwhelmingly occidental in character: ‘free trade’, as sponsored by the Euro-American 
powers, sought to obliterate the borders of oriental jurisdictions, the better to promote the 
expansion of their massively advantageous position in manufacturing. However their efforts 
to sustain that in the latter part of the twentieth century failed, partly as a result of the 
deliberate outsourcing of manufacturing activities to locations where labour cost were lower, 
but even more so because of the their entrepreneurial energy of their former imperial 
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subjects. This has taken at least two forms. In the first place the emergence of state-of-the-art 
manufacturing initiatives in South and East Asia, together with their careful avoidance of 
arcane forms of financial engineering, and hence the destructive impact of Euro-America’s 
regular credit bubbles. But if these developments served to place the occidental powers on the 
back foot in economic terms, they have also found themselves facing an equally alarming set 
of transgressive initiatives from within: those mounted by long-distance migrants who have 
quietly established a significant foothold with the walls of their increasingly imperilled 
jurisdictions. In this phase of globalisation – driven as it is by ever more powerful oriental 
initiatives, which are now beginning to be perceived as emanating as much from above as 
below – which has begun to generate ever more popular demands that the drawbridge should 
be raised to keep the barbarians at bay.  
History suggests that this is most unlikely to precipitate the desired outcome. As occidental 
economies have steadily collapsed, and their manufacturing bases have turned into rust-belts, 
the centre of gravity of the global economy has swung steadily back in an Asiatic direction. 
But given their unassuagable appetite for manufactured goods, together with the fact that an 
ever-increasing proportion of the sharpest minds in Euro-American Universities are made up 
of students of oriental ancestry, merely hauling up the drawbridge and hoping for the best 
offers no more of a solution than when China and Japan sought to deployed similar tactics in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth century. However bitter the medicine may be, Euro-Americans 
can no longer afford to take it as read that the moral and conceptual foundations of their own 
civilization is superior to all others, most especially since it is becoming increasingly clear 
that the contemporary products of the premises of the enlightenment have begun to look 
increasingly moth-eaten, and nowhere more so than in the sphere of personal and family life.  
We live in a plural world. We have always lived in a plural world; and if current processes of 
globalisation have anything to teach us it that gaining the capacity to operate with ease in 
contexts of ethnic plurality, no less than cooperation and competition, are, and are set to 
remain, an inescapable component of the human condition. If that is indeed the case, it 
follows that it has now become essential to discard a key trope in enlightenment thinking: 
namely that in the fullness of time processes of universalisation will lead humankind towards 
an increasingly a singular future, and hence a uniform condition of homogeneous perfection. 
Likewise there is no realistic prospect of such a condition of uniformity being achieved even 
within the parochial context of narrow local jurisdiction.   
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Regardless of the condition of comprehensive homogeneity which has regularly underpinned 
enlightenment-generated nationalist dreams, plurality is here to stay. Nor is plurality a recipe 
for chaos: our ancestors lived with it as a matter of course. It is only the anti-pluralist 
premises of the enlightment mainstream, rooted amongst other things in the premises of the 
treaty of Westphalia, in the teachings of Augustine of Hippo, and perhaps even those of Paul 
the Apostle which has led Euro-America us to this pass. Contrary to popular assumptions, our 
ancestors were far more at ease with the prospect of living with difference than we moderns 
(Ballard 2007). If we are ever to regain the intellectual capacity, as well as the social and 
cultural skills required to navigate the seas of diversity, we need to step beyond our current 
condition of modernity, and to relearn the skills of our ancestors, and to which, in a final 
irony, the transgressors from below whose entrepreneurial efforts are currently such alarm to 
the indigenous populations of Euro-America owe a substantial part of their success. 
As Jagdish Bhagwati argued in Foreign Affairs close to a decade ago, such are the scale and 
complexity of contemporary global movements of persons is such that no amount of visa 
restriction, of wall building, of maritime surveillance, or to bring his argument up to date, of 
biometric scrutiny, will enable migration managers to close the gates. Moreover the pass has 
already been sold: there is no need for a Trojan horse, given the presence of well established 
ethnic colonies within the walls of each such jurisdiction. Neither the construction of ever 
finer sieves to control the passage of persons across jurisdictional borders, nor the demotion 
of substantial part of those resident within them to the status of denizens rather than citizens 
will resolve these issues, no matter what popular opinion may suggest.  
Just when and how these ever sharpening contradictions will be resolved remains most 
unclear. Nevertheless there is one prerequisite for progress which is plain as a pikestaff. So 
long as the indigenous population of Euro-America, and especially its opinion formers, 
doggedly refuse to step beyond the premises of modernity, and hence of the universalistic 
premises of the enlightment, they will find themselves trapped behind major conceptual 
barriers problems which render it difficult for them to appreciate the prospect that plurality 
might be a normal feature of human experience, and one which can readily be accommodated 
within, and is in many respect a prerequisite for,  a viable and equitable social order.. 
Unfortunately the weight of academic as well as popular opinion in Euro-America seems 
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